This paper presents a set-theoretical conceptual framework for theorizing about (possible) events, and states some analytical and synthetical principles which describe the way in which the concept of reality (or actuality) applies to them. The conceptual framework has few primitives, but is nevertheless of great definitional power; the demonstration of this will fill the first part of the paper.
< t or t = t'.)
The assumptions presented in connection with these three primitives are minimal. They may, of course, be extended. No objections to this.
Defined concepts Monadic concepts:
Dl. S is a momentary state iff S is a non-empty subset of S.
D2. S is a total momentary state iff S is a singleton subset of S.

D3. R is a temporal region iff R is a non-empty subset of T.
D4. R is a minimal temporal region iff R is a singleton subset of T.
D5. R is a connected temporal region iff R is a temporal region, and for all elements t, t 1 of R: all t" with t -<t" -< t' are elements of R.
A connected temporal region is a set of time-points that has no lacunae with respect to T and every minimal temporal region are trivially connected temporal regions.
D6. R is an interrupted temporal region iff R is a temporal region, but not a connected one.
D7. f is an event iff f is a (set-theoretical) function, the domain of f is a temporal region, and for all elements t of the domain of f; f (t) is a momentary state.
The motivation behind this definition is that anything whose intrinsic make is described by stating what is going on at each moment of a certain stretch of time (interrupted or not) is an event, and that an event is always something whose intrinsic make is described by stating what is going on at each moment of a certain stretch of time. This conception of events is at least as legitimate as any of the many others that have been put forward in recent years. Events are, of course, not literally certain set-theoretical functions; but they can be conceptualised as being such functions.
Who would like to reserve the term 'event' for something more specific than what is described by the definiens of D7 is free to do so; he may take the definiens of D7 to define the predicate 'f is a pre-event'; then he can hold that only some pre-events are events, namely pre-events having such and such properties. D8. f is a momentary event iff f is an event whose domain is a minimal temporal region.
D9
. f is a process iff f is an event, but not a momentary one.
Processes form a species of events; this is quite in harmony with ordinary discourse. However, there is also some tendency in ordinary discourse to reserve the term 'event' for momentary events: 'event' has in some uses the connotation of suddenness. D10. f is an uninterrupted process iff f is a process whose domain is a connected temporal region. D12. f is a pure change iff f is an uninterrupted process, and for all t, t' in the domain of f with t different from t': the intersection of f(t) and f(t') is empty.
Dil
The momentary states that are the functional values of a pure change are all incompatible with one another: their intersection is empty: there is no total momentary state* in which they both obtain. The (uninterrupted) movement of a specific particle from one specific place to another specific place between two specific moments of time (in a specific manner, for example, in a straight line and unaccelerated), is an example for a pure change. The momentary states that are succeeding each other in it are all incompatible with one another, because at each moment of the change the particle is at a different place and because the momentary states the particle being at place p and the particle being at place p' are incompatible if p and p' are different.
D13
. f has an end iff f is a process, and there is a t which is element of the domain of f, such that any t' with t -< t' is not element of the domain of (in short: the domain of f has a last element).
D14. f Aas a beginning iff f is a process whose domain has a first element
D15. f is bounded iff f has a beginning and an end.
D16. f is a temporally maximal event iff f is an event whose domain is T.
D17. f is an event maximal in contents iff f is an event, and for all element t of the domain of f: f (t) is a total momentary state.
D18. f is a world-history iff f is an event that is maximal temporally and in contents.
Non-monadic concepts:
D19. R is the temporal extension of f iff f is an event, and R is the domain off. 
D20. S is the state offatt iff f is an event, t is an element of the domain off, and S = f(t).
D21. S is
According to this definition f is a sub-event of g just in the case: the temporal extension of f is contained in the temporal extension of g, and for every moment t in the temporal extension of f the state of f at t is a sub-state of the state of g at t.
It is easy to prove the following results: Every event is a sub-event of itself; any sub-event of a sub-event of x is a sub-event of x; if x and y are subevents of each other, then they are identical. This means that the sub-event-relation has the basic properties of a part-relation.
D23. f is a phase of g iff f is a momentary event that is a sub-event of g, and for all elements t of the domain of f: f(t) C g(t).
From the definiens can be deduced: g(t) = f(t) for the single time-point t in the domain of f.
D24. f is a section of g iff f is a sub-event of g, and for all elements t of the domain of f: f (t) is a subset of g(t)
, and for all elements t, t' of the domain of f such that t <t f : there is no element t" of the domain of g with t •< t" -< which is not a member of the domain of f.
From the definiens can be deduced: g(t) = f(t) for all elements t of the domain of f.
If f is a section of g, then the domain of f captures without residuum a certain stretch of the temporal extension of g, whether this stretch is a connected temporal region or not. Thus an uninterrupted process f is a section of g, if its domain is a subset of the domain of event g and if we have for every element t of its domain g(t) = f(t); but if g is itself an interrupted process, it also has sections which are interrupted processes; moreover every phase of g is also a section of g. D25. f and g are compossible events iff f and g are events, and for every t which is an element both of the domain of f and the domain of g: the intersection of g(t) and f(£) is non-empty. 
Events whose domains have no
